INDEFINITE PROBLEMS WITH CHINA'S ROGUE SPACE PROGRAM
THE FOLLOWING IS A CULMINATION OF SEVERAL RESOURCES (click title link above) AND DETAILS THE MANY PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH CHINA IN SPACE. IF IT IS A RACE, THEY ARE THE DETERMINED OPPOSING TEAM. HOWEVER, THE RACE IS A HUMAN ONE AND IT APPEARS THAT CHINA DOES NOT WANT TO COMPLY WITH UNIFIED GLOBAL INTENTION.
THIS BECOMES A PROBLEM WHEN A PLANET IS FRACTURED WHILE TRYING TO EXPLORE OUTSIDE TERRITORIES AT THE SAME TIME. COMPETITION CAN BE GOOD IN CERTAIN MARKETS, BUT THE SPACE INDUSTRY NEEDS UNIFICATION AND RULES WITH PENALTIES AND NON-INCLUSION AS A DETERRENCE. THIS IS THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE U.S.R.C. - TO CREATE A SYSTEM OF COHESION AMONGST MANKIND SO WE CAN PROLIFERATE EXPLORATION AND STRAY FROM WAR GAMES.
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"PENTAGON WORRIES ABOUT CHINA SPACE TEST"
WASHINGTON (AP) - China's recent success at destroying a satellite in low-Earth orbit threatens the interests of all space-faring nations and posed dangers to human space flight, the Pentagon said Friday.
In its annual report on Chinese military developments, the Pentagon also said the People's Liberation Army is building a greater capacity to launch preemptive strikes. It cited as examples China's acquisition of long-endurance submarines, unmanned combat aircraft and additional precision-guided air-to-ground missiles.
Chinese military training that focuses on no-notice, long-range air strikes "could also indicate planning for preemptive military options in advance of regional crises," the report said.
The Pentagon highlighted its concern about Beijing's anti-satellite test in which a missile was used to destroy one of China's old weather satellites in low-Earth polar orbit; the January test was China's first.
"The test put at risk the assets of all space-faring nations and posed dangers to human space flight due to the creation of an unprecedented amount of debris," the report said, adding that this is an important expansion of China's pursuit of weaponry and strategies that are designed to deny U.S. forces access to areas in Asia.
The Pentagon's forthcoming annual report on Chinese military power will reveal a growing threat from Beijing's new forms of power projection, including anti-satellite weapons and computer network attack forces.
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said yesterday that the report, scheduled for release today, shows how China "has steadily devoted increasing resources to their military."
According to defense officials familiar with the report, it also highlights new strategic missile developments, including China's five new Jin-class submarines, and states that Beijing continues to hide the true level of its military spending.
The officials also said that the report will detail how China is developing two new types of strategic forces that go beyond what nations have done traditionally using air, sea and land forces by aiming to knock out modern communications methods on which the U.S. military relies for advanced warfighting techniques.
First, U.S. intelligence officials estimate that by 2010 China's ASAT missiles will be capable of delivering a knockout blow to many U.S. military satellites. Second, China also is training large numbers of military computer hackers to deliver crippling electronic attacks on U.S. military and civilian computer networks.
Mr. Gates described this year's report as an honest assessment devoid of "arm-waving" and said, "I don't think it does any exaggeration of the threat."
"But it paints a picture of a country that is devoting substantial resources to the military and developing ... some very sophisticated capabilities."
Still, the Pentagon chief said keeping threats in perspective is made harder by China's lack of openness and Beijing's communist leaders refusing to talk enough about "what their intentions are, what their strategies are."
"It would be nice to hear firsthand from the Chinese how they view some of these things," he said.
Asked about China's double-digit percent increases in defense spending for more than a decade and advancing weapon technology, Mr. Gates said: "I think some of the capabilities that are being developed are of concern, sure."
CHINA'S ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS TEST
Shirley Kan
Specialist in National Security Policy
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
On January 11, 2007, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted its first
successful direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test in destroying one of its own
satellites in space. The test raised international concerns about more space debris.
Longer-term, the test raised questions about China’s capability and intention to attack
U.S. satellites. The purpose of this CRS Report, based on open sources and interviews,
is to discuss that ASAT test by China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
and issues about U.S. assessments and policies. This report will not be updated.
China’s Destruction of its Satellite in Space
On January 11, 2007, at 5:28 pm EST, the PRC conducted its first successful directascent
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test, launching a ballistic missile armed with a
kinetic kill vehicle (not an exploding conventional or nuclear warhead) to destroy the
PRC’s Fengyun-1C weather satellite at about 530 miles up in low earth orbit (LEO) in
space. The PLA conducted the test near China’s Xichang Space Center in Sichuan
province. The weapon under development was fired from a mobile transporter-erectorlauncher
(TEL). China reportedly used a two-stage, solid-fuel medium-range ballistic
missile that was launched from a TEL. A U.S. intelligence official testified to Congress
that the U.S. designation of this ASAT weapon is SC-19. A National Security Council
spokesman issued the White House’s public response on January 18, stating that “China’s
development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation
that both countries aspire to in the civil space area.” He stated that the PRC used a landbased,
medium-range ballistic missile. He also noted that the United States and other
countries responded with formal protests to China. Australia, Canada, United Kingdom,
South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the European Union reportedly also issued concerns.
Russia downplayed the test. China did not give advance warnings and its Foreign
Ministry did not issue a public statement until January 23, saying that China calls for the
peaceful use of space and that the test was not aimed at any country.
Issues for Congress
What Are the Security Implications of This ASAT Test?
The critical challenge in the short term is posed by the space debris resulting from
the PRC’s intentional destruction of a satellite. It was the first such destruction of a
satellite since the ASAT tests conducted during the Cold War by the United States and
the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Since then, neither the United States nor Russia has
destroyed satellites in space, while many more civilian and military satellites have been
used by countries and companies. In LEO (up to 2,000 km, or 1,242 miles altitude),
reconnaissance and weather satellites, and manned space missions (including the
International Space Station, Space Shuttle, and China’s manned flights) are vulnerable to
the increase in space debris resulting from China’s satellite destruction. This debris cloud
(estimated at 950 pieces 4 inches or bigger plus thousands of smaller pieces) threatens
space assets in LEO, according to the Johnson Space Center. The Director of Space
Operations at the Air Force said that his staff tracked about 14,000 particles before
January 11, and that number increased to about 15,000. The Commander of the Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) testified that the last U.S. kinetic ASAT test occurred in 1985
and at the lower altitude of LEO, and even so, the debris took over 20 years to come down
out of space and burn up in the atmosphere. China’s test was in the upper altitude of LEO
and the resulting debris is seen as a threat to space assets for more than 20 years.
According to the Air Force Space Command, the space debris increased the collision risk
for about 700 spacecraft. China has known about international concerns about space
debris.
Various comments by PLA officers and PRC civilian analysts have justified the ASAT
test as needed to counter perceived U.S. “hegemony” in space and target the vulnerability
of U.S. dependence on satellites. A PLA Air Force colonel wrote in late 2006 that U.S.
military power, including long-range strikes, have relied on superiority in space and that
leveraging space technology can allow a rising power to close the gap with advanced
countries more rapidly than trying to catch up.
Did China’s ASAT Test Surprise U.S. Assessments?
Some news reports speculated that this ASAT test surprised U.S. intelligence.
Although China’s test confirmed long-standing Defense Department reporting about
China’s counter-space program, some warnings seemed inconsistent with China’s January
2007 kinetic kill ASAT test. In the three annual reports on the PLA from 2004 to 2006
(required by the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act), the Secretary of Defense
reported to Congress that China could destroy or disable satellites in space “only” by
launching a ballistic missile or space launch vehicle “armed with a nuclear weapon.”
However, the Pentagon’s 2003 report warned that China was developing a “direct-ascent
ASAT system” that could be fielded between 2005 and 2010.
Why the Delay in China’s Official Statement About the Test?
Despite foreign protests, China did not issue an official statement until January 23,
12 days after the ASAT test. China’s Foreign Ministry simply stated that its “experiment”
did not target or threaten any country and that China opposes the weaponization of space
or an arms race in space. Beijing’s lack of a prepared explanation and delay in issuing a
statement raised questions about whether the top leaders approved the PLA’s ASAT tests,
coordinated between the Foreign Ministry and the PLA, miscalculated foreign responses,
or approved the ASAT program and anticipated criticisms but decided anyway to test.
Adding to concerns about China’s intentions, the ASAT test did not come at a time of
bilateral tensions. After the U.S.-China summit in April 2006, NASA and the
STRATCOM proposed civilian and military space contacts with China, and NASA’s
Administrator visited China in September 2006. In this debate, National Security Advisor
Stephen Hadley questioned whether China’s leaders knew about the PLA’s ASAT test in
advance, suggesting that U.S. protests sought to compel top ruler Hu Jintao to become
directly involved or responsible. However, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard
Lawless called the speculation “farfetched,” since Hu is the Central Military Commission
Chairman (as well as Communist Party General-Secretary and PRC President).
Was China Responding to U.S. National Space Policy of 2006?
Some in China argued that the new U.S. National Space Policy prompted China’s
test, while U.S. officials have contended that, regardless, China has developed a range of
counter-space weapons to challenge U.S. space dominance. News reports stressed a
hardline tone of the policy (signed by President Bush in August 2006, with a public
version issued in October 2006), which stated opposition to new space arms control and
denial of the use of space to adversaries “hostile” to U.S. interests. Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph contended that the
United States does not monopolize space or deny access to space for peaceful purposes.
He characterized the space policy as responding to “growing threats” from a number of
countries that “are exploring and acquiring capabilities to counter, attack, and defeat U.S.
space systems,” when the United States is more dependent on space than other nations.
Even before issuance of the U.S. space policy, China conducted three previous tests of
this direct-ascent ASAT weapon and, by September 2006, China had used a ground-based
laser to illuminate a U.S. satellite in several tests of a system to “blind” satellites.
Before and after this latest ASAT test, PRC military and civilian analysts have voiced
concerns about China’s perceived vulnerability against U.S. dominance in military and
space power. After the test, a Senior Colonel of the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences
said that “outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime” and that “if there is a
space superpower, it’s not going to be alone, and China is not going to be the only one.”
Was China Trying to Prod the United States in Arms Control?
In wake of the ASAT weapon test, the PRC’s military and civilian analysts argued
that the PRC’s “peaceful” motive for the test was to prompt the United States to engage
in space arms control. At the United Nations in October and December 2006, the United
States was the only country to vote against a resolution on the “Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space” (PAROS), adopted by the General Assembly. However, PAROS
seeks to prevent the weaponization of outer space, and even if there were such an
agreement, it would not ban the type of land-based ASAT weapon (not space-based
weapon) that China tested.
Indeed, China had already subtly shifted its stance on space arms control at the United
Nations, dropping an original call for not testing, deploying, or using on land, at sea, or
in the atmosphere any weapons for warfighting in outer space.
What are Some Policy Options?
The PRC’s ASAT test raised an issue of whether there are benefits in talking with
China and other countries about an arms control agreement (such as PAROS), a code of
conduct, or other security-building measures. China’s ASAT test did not violate any
existing arms control treaty, although it broke a voluntary moratorium since the 1980s on
such destruction of a satellite. A middle-ground view between seeking and rejecting
sweeping arms control suggested that there could be a narrowly-targeted ban on kinetic
ASAT weapons that create space debris. In contrast, the Bush Administration objected
to the implication that China’s ASAT test was another reason to pursue outer space arms
control, noting that PAROS would not ban China’s ground-launched ASAT activities. There also is an issue about whether to continue or suspend bilateral space cooperation proposed in 2006 by STRATCOM, which could include talks on collision avoidance, signals interference, and station keeping (maneuvering satellites).
For other responses, at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces on March 28, 2007, the STRATCOM Commander urged support for programs for
space situational awareness and Prompt Global Strike.
THIS BECOMES A PROBLEM WHEN A PLANET IS FRACTURED WHILE TRYING TO EXPLORE OUTSIDE TERRITORIES AT THE SAME TIME. COMPETITION CAN BE GOOD IN CERTAIN MARKETS, BUT THE SPACE INDUSTRY NEEDS UNIFICATION AND RULES WITH PENALTIES AND NON-INCLUSION AS A DETERRENCE. THIS IS THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE U.S.R.C. - TO CREATE A SYSTEM OF COHESION AMONGST MANKIND SO WE CAN PROLIFERATE EXPLORATION AND STRAY FROM WAR GAMES.
-------------------------------------------
"PENTAGON WORRIES ABOUT CHINA SPACE TEST"
WASHINGTON (AP) - China's recent success at destroying a satellite in low-Earth orbit threatens the interests of all space-faring nations and posed dangers to human space flight, the Pentagon said Friday.
In its annual report on Chinese military developments, the Pentagon also said the People's Liberation Army is building a greater capacity to launch preemptive strikes. It cited as examples China's acquisition of long-endurance submarines, unmanned combat aircraft and additional precision-guided air-to-ground missiles.
Chinese military training that focuses on no-notice, long-range air strikes "could also indicate planning for preemptive military options in advance of regional crises," the report said.
The Pentagon highlighted its concern about Beijing's anti-satellite test in which a missile was used to destroy one of China's old weather satellites in low-Earth polar orbit; the January test was China's first.
"The test put at risk the assets of all space-faring nations and posed dangers to human space flight due to the creation of an unprecedented amount of debris," the report said, adding that this is an important expansion of China's pursuit of weaponry and strategies that are designed to deny U.S. forces access to areas in Asia.
The Pentagon's forthcoming annual report on Chinese military power will reveal a growing threat from Beijing's new forms of power projection, including anti-satellite weapons and computer network attack forces.
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said yesterday that the report, scheduled for release today, shows how China "has steadily devoted increasing resources to their military."
According to defense officials familiar with the report, it also highlights new strategic missile developments, including China's five new Jin-class submarines, and states that Beijing continues to hide the true level of its military spending.
The officials also said that the report will detail how China is developing two new types of strategic forces that go beyond what nations have done traditionally using air, sea and land forces by aiming to knock out modern communications methods on which the U.S. military relies for advanced warfighting techniques.
First, U.S. intelligence officials estimate that by 2010 China's ASAT missiles will be capable of delivering a knockout blow to many U.S. military satellites. Second, China also is training large numbers of military computer hackers to deliver crippling electronic attacks on U.S. military and civilian computer networks.
Mr. Gates described this year's report as an honest assessment devoid of "arm-waving" and said, "I don't think it does any exaggeration of the threat."
"But it paints a picture of a country that is devoting substantial resources to the military and developing ... some very sophisticated capabilities."
Still, the Pentagon chief said keeping threats in perspective is made harder by China's lack of openness and Beijing's communist leaders refusing to talk enough about "what their intentions are, what their strategies are."
"It would be nice to hear firsthand from the Chinese how they view some of these things," he said.
Asked about China's double-digit percent increases in defense spending for more than a decade and advancing weapon technology, Mr. Gates said: "I think some of the capabilities that are being developed are of concern, sure."
CHINA'S ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS TEST
Shirley Kan
Specialist in National Security Policy
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
On January 11, 2007, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted its first
successful direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test in destroying one of its own
satellites in space. The test raised international concerns about more space debris.
Longer-term, the test raised questions about China’s capability and intention to attack
U.S. satellites. The purpose of this CRS Report, based on open sources and interviews,
is to discuss that ASAT test by China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
and issues about U.S. assessments and policies. This report will not be updated.
China’s Destruction of its Satellite in Space
On January 11, 2007, at 5:28 pm EST, the PRC conducted its first successful directascent
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test, launching a ballistic missile armed with a
kinetic kill vehicle (not an exploding conventional or nuclear warhead) to destroy the
PRC’s Fengyun-1C weather satellite at about 530 miles up in low earth orbit (LEO) in
space. The PLA conducted the test near China’s Xichang Space Center in Sichuan
province. The weapon under development was fired from a mobile transporter-erectorlauncher
(TEL). China reportedly used a two-stage, solid-fuel medium-range ballistic
missile that was launched from a TEL. A U.S. intelligence official testified to Congress
that the U.S. designation of this ASAT weapon is SC-19. A National Security Council
spokesman issued the White House’s public response on January 18, stating that “China’s
development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation
that both countries aspire to in the civil space area.” He stated that the PRC used a landbased,
medium-range ballistic missile. He also noted that the United States and other
countries responded with formal protests to China. Australia, Canada, United Kingdom,
South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the European Union reportedly also issued concerns.
Russia downplayed the test. China did not give advance warnings and its Foreign
Ministry did not issue a public statement until January 23, saying that China calls for the
peaceful use of space and that the test was not aimed at any country.
Issues for Congress
What Are the Security Implications of This ASAT Test?
The critical challenge in the short term is posed by the space debris resulting from
the PRC’s intentional destruction of a satellite. It was the first such destruction of a
satellite since the ASAT tests conducted during the Cold War by the United States and
the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Since then, neither the United States nor Russia has
destroyed satellites in space, while many more civilian and military satellites have been
used by countries and companies. In LEO (up to 2,000 km, or 1,242 miles altitude),
reconnaissance and weather satellites, and manned space missions (including the
International Space Station, Space Shuttle, and China’s manned flights) are vulnerable to
the increase in space debris resulting from China’s satellite destruction. This debris cloud
(estimated at 950 pieces 4 inches or bigger plus thousands of smaller pieces) threatens
space assets in LEO, according to the Johnson Space Center. The Director of Space
Operations at the Air Force said that his staff tracked about 14,000 particles before
January 11, and that number increased to about 15,000. The Commander of the Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) testified that the last U.S. kinetic ASAT test occurred in 1985
and at the lower altitude of LEO, and even so, the debris took over 20 years to come down
out of space and burn up in the atmosphere. China’s test was in the upper altitude of LEO
and the resulting debris is seen as a threat to space assets for more than 20 years.
According to the Air Force Space Command, the space debris increased the collision risk
for about 700 spacecraft. China has known about international concerns about space
debris.
Various comments by PLA officers and PRC civilian analysts have justified the ASAT
test as needed to counter perceived U.S. “hegemony” in space and target the vulnerability
of U.S. dependence on satellites. A PLA Air Force colonel wrote in late 2006 that U.S.
military power, including long-range strikes, have relied on superiority in space and that
leveraging space technology can allow a rising power to close the gap with advanced
countries more rapidly than trying to catch up.
Did China’s ASAT Test Surprise U.S. Assessments?
Some news reports speculated that this ASAT test surprised U.S. intelligence.
Although China’s test confirmed long-standing Defense Department reporting about
China’s counter-space program, some warnings seemed inconsistent with China’s January
2007 kinetic kill ASAT test. In the three annual reports on the PLA from 2004 to 2006
(required by the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act), the Secretary of Defense
reported to Congress that China could destroy or disable satellites in space “only” by
launching a ballistic missile or space launch vehicle “armed with a nuclear weapon.”
However, the Pentagon’s 2003 report warned that China was developing a “direct-ascent
ASAT system” that could be fielded between 2005 and 2010.
Why the Delay in China’s Official Statement About the Test?
Despite foreign protests, China did not issue an official statement until January 23,
12 days after the ASAT test. China’s Foreign Ministry simply stated that its “experiment”
did not target or threaten any country and that China opposes the weaponization of space
or an arms race in space. Beijing’s lack of a prepared explanation and delay in issuing a
statement raised questions about whether the top leaders approved the PLA’s ASAT tests,
coordinated between the Foreign Ministry and the PLA, miscalculated foreign responses,
or approved the ASAT program and anticipated criticisms but decided anyway to test.
Adding to concerns about China’s intentions, the ASAT test did not come at a time of
bilateral tensions. After the U.S.-China summit in April 2006, NASA and the
STRATCOM proposed civilian and military space contacts with China, and NASA’s
Administrator visited China in September 2006. In this debate, National Security Advisor
Stephen Hadley questioned whether China’s leaders knew about the PLA’s ASAT test in
advance, suggesting that U.S. protests sought to compel top ruler Hu Jintao to become
directly involved or responsible. However, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard
Lawless called the speculation “farfetched,” since Hu is the Central Military Commission
Chairman (as well as Communist Party General-Secretary and PRC President).
Was China Responding to U.S. National Space Policy of 2006?
Some in China argued that the new U.S. National Space Policy prompted China’s
test, while U.S. officials have contended that, regardless, China has developed a range of
counter-space weapons to challenge U.S. space dominance. News reports stressed a
hardline tone of the policy (signed by President Bush in August 2006, with a public
version issued in October 2006), which stated opposition to new space arms control and
denial of the use of space to adversaries “hostile” to U.S. interests. Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph contended that the
United States does not monopolize space or deny access to space for peaceful purposes.
He characterized the space policy as responding to “growing threats” from a number of
countries that “are exploring and acquiring capabilities to counter, attack, and defeat U.S.
space systems,” when the United States is more dependent on space than other nations.
Even before issuance of the U.S. space policy, China conducted three previous tests of
this direct-ascent ASAT weapon and, by September 2006, China had used a ground-based
laser to illuminate a U.S. satellite in several tests of a system to “blind” satellites.
Before and after this latest ASAT test, PRC military and civilian analysts have voiced
concerns about China’s perceived vulnerability against U.S. dominance in military and
space power. After the test, a Senior Colonel of the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences
said that “outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime” and that “if there is a
space superpower, it’s not going to be alone, and China is not going to be the only one.”
Was China Trying to Prod the United States in Arms Control?
In wake of the ASAT weapon test, the PRC’s military and civilian analysts argued
that the PRC’s “peaceful” motive for the test was to prompt the United States to engage
in space arms control. At the United Nations in October and December 2006, the United
States was the only country to vote against a resolution on the “Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space” (PAROS), adopted by the General Assembly. However, PAROS
seeks to prevent the weaponization of outer space, and even if there were such an
agreement, it would not ban the type of land-based ASAT weapon (not space-based
weapon) that China tested.
Indeed, China had already subtly shifted its stance on space arms control at the United
Nations, dropping an original call for not testing, deploying, or using on land, at sea, or
in the atmosphere any weapons for warfighting in outer space.
What are Some Policy Options?
The PRC’s ASAT test raised an issue of whether there are benefits in talking with
China and other countries about an arms control agreement (such as PAROS), a code of
conduct, or other security-building measures. China’s ASAT test did not violate any
existing arms control treaty, although it broke a voluntary moratorium since the 1980s on
such destruction of a satellite. A middle-ground view between seeking and rejecting
sweeping arms control suggested that there could be a narrowly-targeted ban on kinetic
ASAT weapons that create space debris. In contrast, the Bush Administration objected
to the implication that China’s ASAT test was another reason to pursue outer space arms
control, noting that PAROS would not ban China’s ground-launched ASAT activities. There also is an issue about whether to continue or suspend bilateral space cooperation proposed in 2006 by STRATCOM, which could include talks on collision avoidance, signals interference, and station keeping (maneuvering satellites).
For other responses, at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces on March 28, 2007, the STRATCOM Commander urged support for programs for
space situational awareness and Prompt Global Strike.
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